A dominant strategy, double clock auction with estimation-based tâtonnement by Loertscher, Simon & Mezzetti, Claudio
A Dominant Strategy, Double Clock Auction with
Estimation-Based Tâtonnement∗
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1 Introduction
The study of price formation and market making with variable demand and supply and a
focus on the efficient allocation of resources has a long tradition in economics. Walras (1874)
proposed a procedure, called tâtonnement, in which buyers and sellers quote their demands
and supplies at a given price to an auctioneer that increases the price if there is excess demand
and decreases it if there is excess supply, with transactions only taking place when equilibrium
is reached. One important problem with the Walrasian tâtonnement is that agents do not have
an incentive to indicate truthfully their demand and supply schedules, as their bidding affects
the final price.1 In his landmark paper, Vickrey (1961) showed that it is possible to elicit the
true demands and supplies and implement the efficient allocation, using a generalization of
the static auction that bears his name. Observing that it runs a deficit and hence must be
financed by an outside source, Vickrey was skeptical about the practical relevance of the market
mechanism he proposed, calling it “inordinately expensive” for the market maker. Vickrey did
not see an easy way to modify it so as to avoid the deficit, preserve the truth telling property
and achieve an approximately efficient allocation, noting (Vickrey, 1961, p.13-14):
It is tempting to try to modify this scheme in various ways that would reduce or
eliminate this cost of operation while still preserving the tendency to optimum re-
source allocation. However, it seems that all modifications that do diminish the
cost of the scheme either imply the use of some external information as to the
true equilibrium price or reintroduce a direct incentive for misrepresentation of the
marginal-cost and marginal-value curves. To be sure, in some cases the impair-
ment of optimum allocation would be small relative to the reduction in cost, but,
unfortunately, the analysis of such variations is extremely difficult; ...
In this paper, we propose a novel double clock auction that induces price taking behavior by
all buyers and sellers at all times and hence elicits revelation of the true quantities demanded
and supplied, without running a deficit. We do so for a general environment in which traders
have multi-unit demands and supplies and multi-dimensional private information about their
marginal values and costs. We view our double clock auction as a possible solution to the
challenges identified by Vickrey. Under mild regularity conditions, we show that our double
clock auction generates an outcome converging to the efficient allocation at rate 1{n as the
number n of traders grows.
As emphasized by Ausubel (2004), two fundamental prescriptions for practical auction
design derived from the auction literature are that the prices paid by an agent ought to be as
1 The substantial impact on social welfare of strategic behavior in tâtonnement mechanisms was discussed
by Babaioff et al. (2014). As they pointed out, tâtonnement mechanisms “are used, for example, in the daily
opening of the New York Stock Exchange and the call market for copper and gold in London.”
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independent as possible from her own bids, and that the auction should be structured in an
open, dynamic fashion, so as to convey clear price information to bidders and to preserve the
privacy of the winners’ valuations. Under the latter property, market participants are protected
from hold up by the designer, because they do not reveal their willingness to pay on units they
trade, and the designer is protected from the often substantial political and public risk of ex
post regret – not knowing the agents’ willingness to pay makes it difficult if not impossible to
claim that there was “money left on the table.”2
Our double clock auction (DCA) satisfies both prescriptions. It consists of a descending
clock price for sellers and an ascending clock price for buyers. At every point in the DCA,
traders indicate the number of units they are active, or bid, on, with activity meaning that this
is the number of units they supply (demand) if they are sellers (buyers). There is a monotone
activity rule that stipulates that in the course of the auction a trader can only decrease her
activity. Once an agent’s activity has dropped to zero, the agent is said to have dropped
out (or exited). Based on information obtained only from agents who have exited, the DCA
estimates supply and demand and, at any point in the process, sets target prices that are such
that estimated excess demand is zero. If a given target price is reached without any additional
exits, this target price becomes the reserve price. If an additional exit occurs before the target
is reached, supply and demand are estimated anew, the target price is adjusted, and the DCA
proceeds as before until the earliest of two points in time – both clock prices reach the target
price, or an additional trader drops out.
Once both clock prices reach the target price, this price becomes the reserve, and the
quantities supplied and demanded by all remaining active traders are used to determine whether
buyers or seller are on the long side of the market at the reserve. If aggregate quantity demanded
equals aggregate quantity supplied at the reserve, then all trades are executed at this price.
Otherwise, agents on the long side participate in an Ausubel (2004) auction, starting at the
reserve.
We show that sincere bidding by each agent is a dominant strategy equilibrium in the DCA.
By construction, it never runs a deficit. It is ex post individually rational and satisfies con-
strained efficiency, that is, the units traded in the DCA are procured at minimum cost and
allocated to buyers to maximize value. Constrained efficiency eliminates post-allocation gains
from trade on each side of the market and thereby reduces scope for resale and, related, bid
shading. Moreover, like privacy preservation, it eliminates political fall-out due to discrimi-
nation that arises when, say, a buyer who submitted a lower bid for a unit is served while a
2The practice of mechanism design and historical experience with auctions offer plenty of examples of such
public outcry. The 1990 spectrum license auction in New Zealand is one famous example of political risk due
to ex post regret (see, for example, McMillan, 1994, or Milgrom, 2004). That static, sealed bid, mechanisms
are prone to the bidders’ hold-up problem was known by stamp collectors before the middle of the 20th century
(Lucking-Reiley, 2000).
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buyer with a higher value is not served. We also provide conditions under which the DCA
is asymptotically efficient. Asymptotic efficiency obtains, for example, in the order statistics
model (Burdett and Woodward, 2020), according to which each buyer (seller) draws a num-
ber of values (costs) independently from the same distribution equal to its maximum demand
(capacity).
Our paper relates to the literature on dominant strategy mechanisms in the tradition of
Vickrey (1961), Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973). There are particularly close connections to
papers that develop deficit-free dominant strategy mechanisms such as Hagerty and Rogerson
(1987) and McAfee (1992). We provide a detailed discussion of these in Section 4, after we
have formally introduced our double clock auction and derived its key properties. The paper,
and the double clock auction we design, draws inspiration from the extended body of research
that has emphasized advantages of clock auctions in a one-sided environment, such as Ausubel
(2004, 2006), Ausubel et al. (2006), Perry and Reny (2005), Bergemann and Morris (2007),
Levin and Skrzypacz (2016), Li (2017), Sun and Yang (2009, 2014), and Milgrom and Segal
(2020).3 Perry and Reny (2005, p.568), for example, argue that “simultaneous auction formats
tend to treat information as if it were costless to collect and costless to provide” while dynamic
auctions economize on the information collected.
The paper also relates to the recent and growing literature on mechanism design with
estimation initiated by Baliga and Vohra (2003) and Segal (2003).4 In that literature, the
designer’s objective is profit-maximization, and hence the objects to be estimated are hazard
rates and virtual types. In contrast, our market maker’s objective is social surplus, without
running a deficit, and so the object to be estimated is the Walrasian price. An alternative
route to estimating Walrasian prices is taken by Kojima and Yamashita (2017) in a paper that
assumes interdependent values and was developed in parallel to the present one. Like ours,
Kojima and Yamashita (2017) use an Ausubel auction on the long side. Their mechanism
randomly splits traders into different submarkets and uses reports from all other submarkets to
estimate the market clearing price in a given submarket; it assumes single dimensional types,
thereby escaping from the impossibility results that plague ex post implementation (see, e.g.,
Jehiel et al., 2006) when two-stage mechanisms as in Mezzetti (2004) are not allowed. Because
traders are randomly split in mechanisms in the tradition of Baliga and Vohra (2003), these
mechanisms are not constrained efficient and, with single-unit traders, fail to be envy-free.
Moreover, none of the papers above has two-sided clock auctions with multi-unit demands and
multi-dimensional information.
3Ausubel’s 2004 proposed a clock implementation of the VCG mechanism for the case of homogeneous goods.
For subsequent generalizations to the case of heterogeneous objects, see Ausubel (2006), and Sun and Yang
(2009, 2014).
4See also Loertscher and Marx (2020), who develop a prior-free clock auction that is asymptotically profit-
maximizing in an environment with single-unit traders and independently distributed types.
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Of course, the very idea of a tâtonnement process to discover market clearing prices dates
back to Walras (1874), and so our paper is also tightly connected to the literature on the de-
centralized micro-foundations of competitive equilibrium, such as Satterthwaite and Williams
(1989, 2002), Rustichini et al. (1994), and Cripps and Swinkels (2006) as well as to Reny and
Perry (2006), who study the related question of the foundations of rational expectation equilib-
rium.5 Our double clock auction can be viewed as providing a centralized micro-foundation in
which the “Walrasian” auctioneer does the heavy lifting while endowing agents with dominant
strategies. Rather than getting rid of the Walrasian auctioneer, it fills her role with substance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the setup. In Section
3, we introduce the DCA and derive its key properties. Section 4 provides a comparison of
different mechanisms in the small and a discussion of the most closely related literature. Section
5 introduces conditions under which the double clock auction is asymptotically efficient, and
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Setup
There is a set N “ t1, ..., Nu of buyers, and a set M “ t1, ...,Mu of sellers of a homogeneous
good. In Section 5, to study convergence to efficiency, we will proportionally expand the sets
of buyers and sellers to N “ t1, ..., nNu and M “ t1, ..., nMu and we will let n go to infinity.
Denote by vb “
´
vb1, ..., v
b
kB
¯
the valuation, or type, of buyer b P N , where vbk P r0, 1s is
buyer b’s marginal value for the k-th unit of the good and kB is an upper bound on each buyer’s
demand. Denote by cs “
´
cs1, ..., c
s
kS
¯
the cost, or type, of seller s P M, where csk P r0, 1s
is seller s’s cost for producing, or giving up the use of, the k-th unit and kS is an upper
bound on each seller’s capacity.6 Let v “
`
v1, ...,vN
˘
“
`
vb,v´b
˘
be the profile of valuations,
c “
`
c1, ..., cM
˘
“ pcs, c´sq be the profile of costs, and θ “ pv, cq “ pvb,θ´bq “ pcs,θ´sq.
We assume diminishing marginal values and increasing marginal costs; that is, for all b P N ,
all k P t1, .., kB ´ 1u, we have v
b
k ě v
b
k`1 and, for all s P M, all k P t1, .., kS ´ 1u, we have
csk ď c
s
k`1. A buyer b receiving q goods at unit prices p
b
1, ..., p
b
q obtains payoff
řq
k“1
`
vbk ´ p
b
k
˘
; a
buyer receiving no units and making no payments has zero payoff. Similarly, a seller s selling q
goods at prices ps1, ..., p
s
q obtains payoff
řq
k“1 pp
s
k ´ c
s
kq; a seller receiving no payments and selling
no units has zero payoff. The payoff functions and the upper bounds on traders’ capacities are
common knowledge, but marginal values and marginal costs are private information of each
trader.7
5Other papers on the convergence to competitive equilibrium in the single-unit case include Gresik and
Satterthwaite (1989) who looked at optimal trading mechanisms, Yoon (2001) who studied a double auction
with participation fees and Tatur (2005), who introduced a double auction with a fixed fee. For the multi-unit
case, Yoon (2008) introduced the participatory Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism.
6The assumption that values and costs are in r0, 1s is just a normalization.
7Our results remain valid when traders have complete information about all marginal values and costs. This
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The mechanism we propose has an open bid, clock format. As ours is a setting with active
buyers and sellers (as opposed to a one-sided auction), the mechanism is a double clock auction;
that is, it will be run with an ascending clock on the buyers’ side and a descending clock on the
sellers’ side. This implies that the mechanism is privacy preserving; that is, it does not reveal
the marginal values or marginal costs of the units that are traded.8 Our mechanism is robust
in the sense of Bergemann and Morris (2005), because it satisfies dominant strategy incentive
compatibility, so that agents do not need well specified beliefs about the other agents’ types in
order to bid optimally.
Denote the individualized price vector of agent i by pipθ´iq “
`
pi0pθ
´iq, ..., pikipθ
´iq
˘
, where
pik
`
θ´i
˘
is the price buyer i must pay (seller i is paid) for the k-th unit of the good.9 Using
the convention vb0 “ c
s
0 “ 0 for all b and s, let the quantities traded by each buyer b P N and
seller s PM at their personalized prices be:
qbppbpθ´bq,vbq “ arg max
0ďqďkB
q
ÿ
k“0
´
vbk ´ p
b
kpθ
´bq
¯
and
qsppspθ´sq, csq “ arg max
0ďqďkS
q
ÿ
k“0
`
pskpθ
´sq ´ csk
˘
Let qBpθq “
ř
bPN q
bppbpθ´bq,vbq be the total quantity acquired by buyers and qSpθq “
ř
sPM q
sppspθ´sq, csq be the total quantity sold by sellers.
A mechanism is feasible if for every θ, qBpθq “ qSpθq.
10
Given that the outside option has zero value for every agent, a mechanism satisfies ex post
individual rationality if for all b, θ “
`
vb,θ´b
˘
and for all s, θ “ pcs,θ´sq:
pb0pθ
´bq ď 0 ; ps0pθ
´sq ě 0 .
The profit a mechanism generates at θ is:
Πpθq “
ÿ
bPN
qbppbpθ´bqq
ÿ
qb“0
pbqbpθ
´bq ´
ÿ
sPM
qsppspθ´sqq
ÿ
qs“0
psqspθ
´sq ;
a mechanism is deficit free if for all θ, Πpθq ě 0.
The performance of any allocation mechanism that targets welfare maximization must be
evaluated in term of its efficiency level. In our setting, full ex post efficiency, which implies
is because in the DCA we introduce traders have the dominant strategy of bidding sincerely.
8See Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1991), Naor et al. (1999), Ausubel (2004) and Milgrom and Segal
(2020) for discussions of the importance of this requirement.
9By the taxation and revelation principles (see Rochet, 1985, and Myerson, 1979), any dominant strategy
mechanism is strategically equivalent to a “direct” price mechanism that sets an individualized marginal price
vector for each agent as a function of the other agents’ types and lets each agent decide how many units to trade
at the specified prices.
10If there was free disposal, we could weaken the feasibility condition to qBpθq ď qSpθq, but this would not
help in any substantial way in the design of our DCA.
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feasibility, requires that for all possible type profiles the buyers with the highest marginal
valuations trade with the sellers with the lowest marginal costs and that the total quantity
traded is qBpθq “ qSpθq “ qCEpθq, where qCEpθq is a Walrasian (competitive equilibrium)
quantity associated with θ:11
max
 
q P t0, ...,Ku : vpqq ą crqs
(
ď qCE pθq ď max
 
q P t0, ...,Ku : vpqq ě crqs
(
.
In our setting, dominant strategy incentive compatibility and ex post efficiency are satisfied
if and only if the mechanism is a Groves mechanism (e.g., see Holmström, 1979) and ex post
individual rationality and deficit minimization further restrict the mechanism to be a VCG
mechanism. The VCG mechanism is not deficit free. Indeed, in Loertscher and Mezzetti
(2019), we have shown that in the setting of a market for a homogeneous good the two-sided
VCG auction runs a deficit on each trade and the total deficit does not vanish as the number
of traders grows large. While it is not possible to construct a mechanism that is ex post
efficient and deficit free, efficiency is an important feature of an allocation mechanism. Thus,
we require our double clock auction to satisfy two efficiency properties, constrained efficiency
and asymptotic efficiency.
A mechanism is constrained efficient if, given the total quantity traded qpθq “ qBpθq “
qSpθq, the trades completed are the most valuable ones – those associated with the qpθq-th
highest marginal values and the qpθq-th lowest marginal costs. Constrained efficiency is an
appealing property of the price mechanism in competitive and oligopolistic markets.
The total welfare at θ generated by a mechanism is given by the gains of trade:
W pθq “
ÿ
bPN
qbppbpθ´bqq
ÿ
qb“0
vbqbpp
bpθ´bqq ´
ÿ
sPM
qsppspθ´sqq
ÿ
qs“0
csqspp
spθ´sqq .
Let qbCEpθq and q
s
CEpθq be the quantity traded by buyer b and seller s in a Walrasian
equilibrium. Under a fully efficient allocation, total welfare at θ is:
WCEpθq “
ÿ
bPN
qbCEpθq
ÿ
qb“0
vbqbpθq ´
ÿ
sPM
qsCEpθq
ÿ
qs“0
csqspθq ,
Thus, the percentage welfare loss at θ is Lpθq “ 1 ´ W pθqWCEpθq . Let Pφ˚ be the probability
measure determining the true marginal values and costs (i.e., θ) and Eφ˚ be the expectation
operator with respect to Pφ˚ .12 For ρ ą 0, we say that a mechanism is asymptotically efficient
11 Given a vector x, we denote by xpiq its i-th highest element and by xris its i-th lowest element. Thus,
xpqq “ xrm`1´qs if the vector contains m elements. We also adopt the notational convention that vp0q “ 1 and
cr0s “ 0, which implies that qCEpθq is well defined.
12The true probability distribution is not known by the auctioneer or by the traders. There is a set Φ indexing
the possible probability measures Pφ, with φ P Φ. See Section 5 for details.
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at rate 1{nρ if the expected percentage welfare loss converges to zero at rate 1{nρ as the size
of the market n goes to infinity; that is, if there is a constant L ą 0 such that for all n:
Eφ˚ rLpθqs ď L{nρ. Our double clock auction will be constrained efficient and asymptotically
efficient at rate 1{n.
3 The Dominant Strategy Double Clock Auction
There are two clock prices in our DCA, one for buyers and one for sellers. At the start, the
prices for buyers and sellers are pB0 “ 0, p
S
0 “ 1. The buyers’ clock price increases or stays
constant and the sellers’ clock price decreases or stays constant. Each buyer starts the DCA
with a quantity demanded equal to kB and each seller starts with a quantity supplied equal
to kS . Buyers can only take an action when their clock price increases and sellers can only
take an action when their clock price decreases; they may reduce their quantity demanded or
supplied by any non-negative integer.
The DCA is composed of two phases. Phase 1 permits estimated demand and supply
to adjust using the revealed marginal values of the traders that drop out – that is, reduce
their demand or supply to zero – as the buyers’ clock price increases and the sellers’ clock
price decreases. The estimation procedure (to be explained below) determines which of three
possible states prevails at each point during Phase 1: a buyers’ clock state (state BC), in which
only the buyers’ clock price changes; a sellers’ clock state (state SC), in which only the sellers’
clock price changes; a double clock state (state DC), in which both clock prices change. Phase
1 ends when the two clocks reach a common price pTt .
Before describing the precise mechanics of the price adjustment that takes place in Phase
1, which is done in Subsection 3.1, we now complete the specification of how the allocation is
determined in Phase 2.
Phase 2 of the DCA begins by setting the reserve price r. Then it computes the revealed
aggregate demand and supply at the reserve price r of the buyers and sellers who have not
dropped out and determines which side is the long side – the buyers’ side if demand exceeds
supply, the seller’s side if supply exceeds demand at r. The DCA allocates to all traders on the
short side the units they demand or supply and charges the reserve price r for each such unit.
Let qprq be the total quantity demanded or supplied at r on the short side. To ration units
on the long side, the DCA runs an Ausubel auction for qprq units with a clock price starting
at r.13 The Ausubel auction ends when the available qprq units are assigned to traders on the
13An Ausubel auction is a clock version of a Vickrey auction in which each trader pays or is paid the Vickrey
price on each unit it buys or sells. If it is run for sellers as sellers are on the long side, then the clock price
decreases starting from r and sellers decide if and when to reduce their supply. A seller s is paid the current
clock price each time she clinches an additional unit, which happens when the residual supply of the other sellers
has decreased below the number of demanded units qprq minus the units already clinched by s. If it is run for
buyers, the Ausubel auction works similarly, with a clock price increasing starting from the reserve price r.
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long side.
3.1 Description of Phase 1 of the DCA
Let NOppBq be the set of buyers whose quantity demanded is zero when the buyers’ clock price
reaches pB and MOppSq be the set of sellers whose quantity supplied is zero when the sellers’
clock price reaches pS . These two sets are the traders who have irrevocably dropped out of the
DCA; these traders cannot re-enter and will trade zero units. The only active traders after the
clock prices have reached pB and pS are the buyers in the set NAppBq “ N zNOppBq and the
sellers in the set MAppSq “MzMOppSq.
In Phase 1 of the DCA, estimation takes place in discrete rounds. A new estimation round
is entered when a trader drops out of the DCA and the sellers’ clock price is higher than
the buyers’ clock price; let pBt ă p
S
t be the clock prices for buyers and sellers in round t.
In estimation round 0, at the start of the DCA, the auctioneer has prior estimates of the
aggregate demand and supply functions. In any other round t ą 0 the auctioneer estimates
the aggregate demand and supply functions using the marginal values of the traders that have
already dropped out (i.e., the traders in NOppBt q and MOppSt q), as revealed from the history
of their demand and supply reductions.14 Let E
“
DN ppBq
‰
be estimated demand at price pB
and E
“
SMppSq
‰
be estimated supply at price pS . While the only public information available
to traders are the state and current clock prices, if traders reduce demand and supply when
their prices reach their marginal values, this history reveals to the auctioneer all the values and
costs of the traders who have become inactive.
Minimum distance estimation will be used to prove the asymptotic efficiency of the DCA;
it will be explained in detail in Section 5.15 However, the precise estimation approach used in
an estimation round is not important for the purpose of establishing the main result of this
section, Theorem 1. Many other methods (e.g., Bayesian estimation, maximum likelihood, OLS
and also ad hoc interpolation methods) would work equally well.16
In Phase 1, following each trader dropout, estimation rounds determine whether there is
estimated excess demand or supply, lead to a transition of the DCA to one of three states (either
a buyers’ clock state, a sellers’ clock state, or a double clock state) and set the target prices in
such states. The aim is to balance estimated demand and supply subject to the monotonicity
14Although our mechanism is different, the idea of using only information from losing bidders is not novel, as it
is the basis for price formation in a single-unit English auction and its strategic equivalence with the second-price
auction. Brooks (2013) also exploits this idea.
15The index that minimizes the distance between the demand and supply functions associated to that index
and the empirical demand and supply functions obtained from the traders that have dropped out of the DCA is
chosen from a set of indexes distinguishing different random processes generating the traders’ valuations. The
chosen index is then used to infer the estimated demand and supply functions.
16Indeed, we will use a combination of OLS and simple interpolation to perform estimation in the order
statistics model that we discuss in Section 4.
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constraints imposed by clock auctions. We next describe Phase 1 algorithmically.
Estimation round t.
• If estimated demand at pBt exceeds estimated supply at pSt (i.e., E
“
DN ppBt q
‰
ą E
“
SMppSt q
‰
),
then Phase 1 of the DCA transitions into a buyers’ clock state (state BC) and:
– The auctioneer sets the buyers’ target price, pTBt`1 “ mintp
EB
t , p
S
t u; where p
EB
t is the
price at which estimated demand equals estimated supply at pSt (i.e., E
“
DN ppEBt q
‰
“
E
“
SMppSt q
‰
).17 (The target price serves as an upper bound on the adjustment of
the buyers’ clock price during the BC state.)
• If estimated supply at pSt exceeds estimated demand at pBt (i.e., E
“
DN ppBt q
‰
ă E
“
SMppSt q
‰
),
then Phase 1 of the DCA transitions into a sellers’ clock state (state SC) and:
– The auctioneer sets the sellers’ target price, pTSt`1 “ maxtp
ES
t , p
B
t u; where p
ES
t is the
price at which estimated supply equals estimated demand at pBt (i.e., E
“
DN ppBt q
‰
“
E
“
SMppESt q
‰
). (The target price serves as a lower bound on the adjustment of the
sellers’ clock price during the SC state.)
• If estimated demand at pBt equals estimated supply at pSt (i.e., E
“
DN ppBt q
‰
“ E
“
SMppSt q
‰
),
then Phase 1 of the DCA transitions into a double clock state (state DC) and:
– The auctioneer sets as the target price for both buyers and sellers in state DC the
estimated market clearing price pTt`1 at which estimated supply equals estimated
demand, E
“
DN ppTt`1q
‰
“ E
“
SMppTt`1q
‰
.
From an estimation round t, the DCA transitions to one of the following three states:
State Bc: Buyers’ clock state.
• The buyers’ clock price pB increases continuously starting from pBt .
• At any price pB, each active buyer b P NAppBq decides whether to reduce her demand.
– If the demand of an active buyer becomes zero at price pB ď pTBt`1, then the auctioneer
sets pBt`1 “ p
B and pSt`1 “ p
S
t and the DCA goes to estimation round t` 1.
– If the clock price pB reaches the target price pTBt`1 ă p
S
t with no buyer dropping out,
then the DCA transitions into state DC with target price pTt`1, the price at which
estimated demand equals estimated supply, E
“
DN ppTt`1q
‰
“ E
“
SMppTt`1q
‰
.
17The target price for buyers is the buyers’ clock price at which estimated demand equals estimated supply
evaluated at the current sellers’ clock price, unless such a price is higher than the current sellers’ clock price, in
which case the latter becomes the buyers’ target price.
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– If the clock price pB reaches the target price pTBt`1 “ p
S
t with no buyer dropping out,
then the auctioneer sets r “ pTBt`1 as the reserve price and the DCA transition into
Phase 2.
State Sc: Sellers’ clock state.
• The sellers’ clock price pS decreases continuously starting from pSt .
• At any price pS , each active seller s PMAppSq decides whether to reduce her supply.
– If the supply of an active seller becomes zero at price pS ě pTSt`1, then the auctioneer
sets pSt`1 “ p
S and pBt`1 “ p
B
t and the DCA goes to estimation round t` 1.
– If the clock price pS reaches the target price pTSt`1 ą p
B
t with no seller dropping out,
then the DCA transitions into state DC with target price pTt`1, the price at which
estimated demand equals estimated supply, E
“
DN ppTt`1q
‰
“ E
“
SMppTt`1q
‰
.
– If the clock price pS reaches the target price pTSt`1 “ p
B
t with no seller dropping out,
then the auctioneer sets r “ pTSt`1 as the reserve price and the DCA transitions into
Phase 2.
State Dc: Double clock state.
• The buyers’ clock price pB increases continuously starting from pBt and the sellers’ clock
price pS decreases continuously starting from pSt in such a way that equality of esti-
mated demand and supply is maintained at all points in time (i.e., at all pB, pS it is
E
“
DN ppBq
‰
“ E
“
SMppSq
‰
), so that, if no trader drops out, pB and pS reach the target
price pTt`1 simultaneously.
• At any price pB, each active buyer decides whether to reduce her demand; at any price
pS , each active seller decides whether to reduce her supply.
– If the demand of one of the active buyers or the supply of one of the active sellers
becomes zero at prices pB ă pTt`1, p
S ą pTt`1, then the auctioneer sets p
B
t`1 “ p
B,
pSt`1 “ p
S and the DCA goes to estimation round t`1 (since estimation is triggered
whenever a trader drops out).
– If prices pB and pS reach the target price pTt`1, then the auctioneer sets r “ p
T
t`1 as
the reserve price and the DCA transitions into Phase 2.
3.2 Properties of the DCA
At all points in the DCA the only information available to the active traders are the phase,
state and current clock prices. We say that an agent engages in sincere bidding if she expresses
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her quantity demanded or supplied truthfully. That is, buyer b bids sincerely if for any buyers’
clock price pB her demand is qb such that vb
qb
ě pB ě vb
qb`1
and seller s bids sincerely if for
any sellers’ clock price pS her supply qs is such that csqs ď p
S ď csqs`1.
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Theorem 1 shows that the DCA is deficit free and constrained efficient – that is, conditional
on the volume of trade, the trades realised are the ones yielding the highest total welfare. Two
points are worth making. First, the DCA typically makes a positive revenue, as buyers pay at
least the reserve price r for each unit they acquire and sellers are paid at most r on each unit
they sell. Second, the DCA is not fully efficient, some profitable trades may be missed because
the reserve price r is set so as to equate estimated aggregate supply and demand, which may
be different from the true realized supply and demand.
Theorem 1. Sincere bidding by each agent is a dominant strategy equilibrium in the DCA.
The DCA is also feasible, deficit free, ex post individually rational and constrained efficient.
Proof. By construction, the DCA is feasible as the quantity traded is determined by the short
side of the market at the reserve price, and it is deficit free since the minimum price paid by
buyers (the reserve price r) is equal to the maximum price paid to sellers (also the reserve price
r). Ex post individual rationality holds since each trader may guarantee herself the outside
option payoff by dropping out of the bidding. Constrained efficiency holds because, under
sincere bidding, for any given quantity to be traded q, the trades that are completed are those
associated with the q highest marginal values and the q lowest marginal costs.
Because of the symmetry of buyers and sellers, to save space we will just argue that sincere
bidding is a dominant strategy for each buyer b.
Case 1. The first case arises if by bidding sincerely buyer b ends up dropping out and not buying
any unit. In such a case, the reserve price r is at least as high as her marginal valuation for
the first item. No alternative strategy could increase buyer b’s payoff, as if she did not drop
out and instead stayed longer in the DCA, so as to acquire at least one unit, then the reserve
price could only be higher and she would end up acquiring units at a price above their marginal
value.
Case 2. The second case arises when by bidding sincerely buyer b acquires at least one unit.
In such a case the reserve price r does not depend on any of buyer b’s marginal values and the
buyer makes a non-negative payoff on any unit she acquires. This implies the following first
conclusion: (i) no strategy that leads buyer b to drop out before price r is reached and thus
acquire zero units is a profitable deviation from sincere bidding.
18There are two reasons why no bid information about the other agents is revealed to a trader. First, it
makes the bidding environment straightforward; much like in the Walrasian analysis of competitive markets, all
information that an agent has is the price she faces. Second, as show in Theorem 1, it makes sincere bidding
by all agents a dominant strategy equilibrium. As in Ausubel (2004), if we allowed either full or aggregate bid
information, then sincere bidding would be an ex post perfect equilibrium.
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Now recall that the DCA uses the revealed demands and supplies of the active traders at
the reserve price r to determine which side of the market is the short side – buyers if supply
exceeds demands, sellers if demands exceeds supply. Suppose first that buyers are on the short
side. Then buyer b pays the reserve price r on all the units she acquires and by bidding sincerely
she acquires all units with marginal values above r. There are two possible kinds of deviations
from sincere bidding under which buyer b continues to acquire some units. The first type leads
to b remaining on the short side of the market. Such a deviation cannot be profitable, because
either b ends up acquiring extra units that she values less than the reserve price r or she gives
up acquiring units that she values above r. The second type of deviation requires buyer b to
increase her demand to the point that buyers end up on the long side of the market. As such
a deviation does not change the reserve price r, it cannot be profitable, as it leads b possibly
to acquire units valued less than the reserve price r and paying at least r on all units. Thus
we have shown that: (ii) there is no profitable deviation from sincere bidding for buyer b when
buyers are on the short side of the market.
Now suppose buyers are on the long side of the market. Again, there are two possible kinds
of deviations from sincere bidding under which buyer b continues to acquire some units. The
first type leads to b remaining on the long side of the market. To see that such a deviation
cannot be profitable, recall that on the long side of the market units are allocated using an
Ausubel auction. If there were a profitable deviation from sincere bidding, it would imply that
such a deviation is profitable in the Ausubel auction, but we know that bidding sincerely is a
dominant strategy in such an auction. The second type of deviation (which may or may not be
feasible) requires buyer b to reduce her demand to the point that buyers end up on the short
side of the market. It leads b to acquire a smaller number of units at the reserve price r. Let
qd be the number of units buyer b acquires under this deviation and ∆d her demand reduction
relative to sincere bidding; that is, under sincere bidding she obtains qd `∆d units. This then
implies that under sincere bidding buyer b clinches at least qd units at the reserve price r in the
Ausubel auction. Thus, the deviation that leads to buyers being on the short side is weakly
dominated by the deviation of staying on the long side and bidding the reserve price r on all
units qd`∆d, but such a deviation is in turn dominated by sincere bidding, as it is a dominant
strategy in the Ausubel auction. This concludes the proof, as it shows that: (iii) there is also
no profitable deviation from sincere bidding for buyer b when buyers are on the long side of
the market.
4 Discussion and Comparisons
Vickrey (1961) first noted that developing mechanisms for two-sided allocation problems that
minimize inefficiencies, do not run a deficit and require no prior information about the true
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equilibrium price is “extremely difficult”. For a bilateral trade setting à la Myerson and Sat-
terthwaite (1983) with the buyer and seller drawing their value and cost independently from
distributions with overlapping support, Hagerty and Rogerson (1987) showed that the best the
market maker can do subject to dominant strategy incentive compatibility, ex post individual
rationality and budget balance is to post an exogenously given price and let the buyer and seller
decide if they want to trade at that price. With only one agent on each side of the market,
there is simply no way of endogenizing the price at which trade occurs without giving up on
dominant strategies (see also Copič and Ponsat́ı, 2016, and Copič, 2017).
McAfee (1992) proposed a double auction that embeds this insight in a setup with multiple
single-unit traders, whose values and costs are elements of the r0, 1s interval, and that endo-
genizes the posted price of Hagerty and Rogerson. There are two clock prices: a decreasing
sellers’ clock price pS and an increasing buyers’ clock price pB. In any round t starting with
the same number of buyers and sellers and clock prices pB and pS , the auctioneer posts a price
pTt “
pB`pS
2 .
19 Both clocks are then run and if no agent exits by the time both clocks reach pTt
(i.e., by the time pB “ pS “ pTt ), then all active agents trade at p
T
t . If the numbers of buyers
and sellers are not the same, either at the outset or after a trader drops out, then only the
clock price on the long side moves until the number of active agents is the same on both sides
of the market. If this happens when the buyers’ clock price pB is lower than the sellers’ clock
price pS , then a new posted price in the middle of the interval ppB, pSq is selected and both
clocks run again. If equality in the number of buyers and sellers is reached when pB ą pS , then
the remaining active traders trade at those prices; buyers pay pB sellers receive pS .
McAfee’s double auction endows traders with dominant strategies and it either implements
trading of the efficient quantity, which happens if trade occurs at a posted price pTt , or it
just excludes the single least efficient trade, which happens if trade occurs at prices pB ą pS .
Although McAfee does not refer to estimation, we argue below that it is natural to interpret
his double auction as using estimates of demand and supply. McAfee’s double auction can also
be viewed as entering an Ausubel auction phase when pB “ pS and the number of traders on
the long side exceeds the number of traders on the short side (with probability one only by one
trader). With single-unit traders, the single clock, Ausubel auction on the long side is simply
a clock implementation of the second-price Vickrey auction, determining the trading price at
the drop-out price of the first trader that exits, the most competitive losing bid.
Our DCA can be viewed as an extension of McAfee’s (1992) double auction to traders
with multi-unit demand and supply for a specific estimation procedure.20 It is worth recalling
19Any choice of a posted price equal to λtp
B
` p1´ λtq p
S , with λt P r0, 1s would work equally well with
regards to the incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints.
20McAfee also proposed a simultaneous bid version of his mechanism, which has been extended in the operation
research and computer science literature (see Chu, 2009, and Segal-Halev et al., 2017, for recent contributions
and references). None of these extensions has considered a setting with multi-dimensional types, or has used a
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that in standard auction formats multi-unit buyers and sellers have an incentive to reduce their
demands and supplies so as to manipulate the prices at which they trade (e.g.,see Ausubel et al.,
2014). Unlike the DCA, many apparently intuitive generalizations of McAfee’s double auction,
that rely on counting the number of drop-outs or on excluding the least efficient trades, in
general either give traders incentives to misrepresent their marginal values or do not guarantee
asymptotic efficiency.
To facilitate comparison with alternative approaches to market clearing and estimation,
and to make the connection between estimation in the DCA and McAfee’s double auction
most transparent, in the remainder of this section we consider a special case of our model, the
order statistics model, in which each buyer has kB independent value draws from an unknown
distribution F with density f and each seller has kS independent cost draws from an unknown
distribution G with density g. If the distributions F and G were known, then expected market
demand and supply at prices pB and pS would be, respectively,
NkBp1´ F pp
Bqq and MkSGpp
Sq. (1)
If kB “ kS “ 1, then |NOppBq|{N – the fraction of buyers that have dropped out when pB is
reached by the buyers’ clock (that starts at 0) – is the empirical distribution of the draws that
are below pB out of N draws from F ; it is thus an estimate of F ppBq. Similarly,MAppSq|{M “
1´|MOppSq|{M – the fraction of sellers that are active when pS is reached by the sellers’ clock
(which starts at 1) – is an estimate of GppSq, as it is the empirical distribution of the draws that
are below pS out of M draws from G. Thus, using (1) estimated demand and supply at pB and
pS are NkBp1´|NOppBq|{Nq “ N ´|NOppBq| and MkS
`
1´ |MOppSq|{M
˘
“M ´|MOppSq|,
which are precisely the true, and McAfee’s “estimated,” demand and supply at pB and pS .
When kB ą 1, the fraction of buyers that have dropped out at pB is instead the empirical
distribution of the draws that are below pB out of N draws from Fp1q – the distributions of the
highest draw out of kB for each buyer. Similarly, if k
S ą 1, then the fraction of sellers that are
active at pS is the empirical distribution of the draws below pS out of M draws from Gr1s – the
distribution of the lowest draw out of kS for each seller. This is because the probability that a
given buyer has dropped out at price pB is Fp1qpp
Bq and the probability that a given seller is
active at price pS is Gr1spp
Sq. The distribution of these order statistics are:
Fp1qpvq “ F pvq
kB and Gr1spcq “ 1´ p1´Gpcqq
kS . (2)
Substituting (2) into (1) after replacing Fp1qpp
Bq and Gr1spp
Sq with their empirical distribu-
tions, it follows that estimated demand and supply at pB and pS using the fractions of active
double clock format.
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traders are:
E
“
DN ppBq
‰
“ NkB
ˆ
1´
´
|NOppBq|
N
¯
1
kB
˙
and E
“
SMppSq
‰
“MkS
ˆ
1´
´
|MOppSq|
M
¯
1
kS
˙
.
(3)
Using these estimates in the DCA while the number of bidders increases to infinity (keeping
N{M constant) leads to setting a reserve price r approximately equal to the Walrasian price pW
at which E
“
DN ppW q
‰
“ E
“
SMppW q
‰
; the DCA is asymptotically efficient. On the contrary,
a “naive” application of McAfee’s estimates of demand and supply would lead the DCA to
set as reserve price the solution p˚ to N ´ |NOpp˚q| “ M ´ |MOpp˚q|; the DCA would be
asymptotically efficient only if N “M and kB “ kS .
To complete the description of the DCA for the order statistics model, one is only left to
specify the estimated demand and supply for prices p P ppB, pSq, which are used to determine
the price at which the adjustments stop if no further exits occur (i.e., the target price) and
the speed of price adjustments in case both clock prices move simultaneously. The approach
followed by McAfee can be interpreted as taking the estimated demand and supply functions
to be linear functions starting from the estimated demand and supply at the current clock
prices pB and pS ; that is, estimated demand at price p ě pB is E
“
DN ppBq
‰
´ λD
`
p´ pB
˘
and
estimated supply at price p ď pS is E
“
SMppSq
‰
` λS
`
p´ pS
˘
for some arbitrary λD, λS ą 0.
In addition, McAfee implicitly assumes λD “ λS , which implies that estimated demand equals
estimated supply at the target price pTt “
pB`pS
2 . In the numerical simulations of the order
statistic model in this section, we will instead estimate the coefficients λD and λS via OLS
using as data the revealed marginal values of all buyers, respectively sellers, that have become
inactive when the prices pB and pS are reached by the DCA’s clocks.21
An alternative approach to estimation and market clearing while respecting incentive com-
patibility and individual rationality constraints is to randomly assign traders to different sub-
markets and use reports from all other sub-markets to estimate the market clearing price in any
given sub-market. For an interdependent values model with multi-unit demands and supplies
and one-dimensional types, Kojima and Yamashita (2017) develop a mechanism that estimates
market clearing prices in this random splitting fashion. After the agents’ reports from the other
sub-markets have been used to determine a given market’s reserve price the double auction of
Kojima and Yamashita, like our DCA, uses an Ausubel auction on the long side.
We now briefly discuss the pros and cons of our DCA and the random splitting mechanism,
and provide a few insightful numerical comparisons. We maintain this paper’s assumption
that the setting is one of private values and confine the discussion and comparisons to this
environment.
21In Section 5, we will assume more generally that the distribution functions from which buyers’ and sellers’
values are drawn belong to a parameterized family, and estimates of demand and supply will be obtained via a
minimum distance approach.
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First, observe that unlike the DCA random splitting mechanisms are not constrained effi-
cient. More generally, the random splitting approach has the downside that it sacrifices the
superior sorting or matching properties that larger markets afford. This is particularly relevant
with small numbers of traders. To appreciate the relevance of sorting, consider the case of
single-unit traders who draw their types independently from the uniform with N “ M “ 2.
Under the random splitting mechanism, welfare is bound above by 1{3 because it cannot pos-
sibly exceed two times expected welfare in a bilateral trade problem. In contrast, the expected
welfare from only executing the trade between the buyer with the higher value and the seller
with the lower cost in an integrated market is 11{30.22
On the other hand, random splitting mechanisms are detail free in the sense of Wilson
(1987) (i.e., make no use of a priori information about traders’ types and beliefs) and have
the advantage of not relying on the informativeness of the behaviour of agents who become
inactive, let alone on the existence of such agents. For an extreme example, if quantities were
continuous variables and traders’ payoff functions satisfied the Inada conditions, then no agent
would be inactive under the efficient allocation. This suggests that in the order statistics model
the DCA will sacrifice more surplus relative to ex post efficiency, for a fixed number of traders,
as the agents’ capacities increase.
Thus, intuitively, one would expect the random splitting approach to be outperformed by
McAfee’s mechanism or the DCA when the number of traders is small; matching is important;
and capacities are small. These intuitions are corroborated by our numerical simulations.
Figure 1 displays simulation results for the DCA and random splitting mechanisms with two
submarkets. The simulations assume that kB “ kS “ k, N “M , and that all values and costs
are drawn from the uniform distribution, but the results are qualitatively the same if all values
and costs are drawn instead from the same Beta-distribution with a symmetric density. Panel
(a) shows that, keeping capacity fixed, the performance of both mechanisms relative to ex post
efficiency improves as N increases. It also shows that with a small number of traders and
relatively small capacities k, the DCA outperforms the random splitting mechanisms. Panel
(b) shows that, as capacities increase while N is kept fixed, the benefits of the DCA relative
to random splitting diminish.
Both the DCA and the random splitting mechanism perform better as k increases. For the
random splitting mechanism, this is as expected because in the order statistics model increases
in k increase the data that can be used for estimation. In contrast, in the DCA the opposite
is the case—as k increases, less data is available for estimation because the probability that
each agent is active at a given price increases in k, which means that the probability that
22For N “ M “ 2, kB “ kS “ 1, and buyers and sellers drawing their types independently from the same
distribution – not necessarily uniform – Loertscher and Mezzetti (2020) show that McAfee’s double auction, and
hence our DCA, generates a higher expected welfare than the random sampling mechanism.
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the DCA reaches the initial target price increases in k. So if the initial target price is equal
to the Walrasian price in the large market limit, which is the case with symmetric densities,
the performance of the DCA improves as k increases because, in a sense, estimation becomes
less important. (Indeed, our simulations—not displayed—show that, for asymmetric densities,
random splitting eventually outperforms the DCA as k increases.)
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Figure 1: Comparisons of DCA and random splitting mechanism with two submarkets. Panel
(a): k “ 3, N P t2, 4, 6, 8, 10u, uniform distributions. Panel (b): N “ 2, k P t1, . . . , 10u,
uniform distributions
5 Asymptotic Efficiency of the DCA
To prove the asymptotic efficiency of the DCA, we now endow the auctioneer with a model
of the random process generating traders’ valuations, allowing the number of traders to grow
large. Thus, as foreshadowed in Section 2, the sets of buyers N and sellers M now contain,
respectively, nN and nM elements, and we study the limit equilibrium outcome as nÑ8.
Given an integer n, we assume that the marginal values and costs of the agents are drawn
from one of the feasible probability measures Pnφ. The set of indexes Φ determines the set of
feasible measures and the index φ P Φ specifies an element of the set. We assume that Φ is a
compact subset of a metric space and that Pnφ is continuous as a function of φ (an assumption
that is trivially satisfied if Φ is a finite set). We make three assumptions about the probability
measures Pnφ. First, we require the expected per capita demand and supply functions they
induce to be strictly monotone. Second, we allow traders’ valuations to be correlated but require
a form of weak dependence of individual demands and supplies which guarantees that the law
of large numbers holds. Third, we impose an identifiability condition that guarantees that
minimum distance estimation can identify the stochastic process generating traders’ valuations.
Note that all three conditions are satisfied by the order statistic model described in the last
section, by just postulating that the possible distribution functions from which buyers’ and
17
sellers’ values are drawn belong to a parameterized family, e.g., FφB pvq “ v
φB and GφS pvq “
vφSwith φ “ pφB, φSq P Φ “ rφ, φs
2. They are also satisfied in a conditionally independent
generalization of the order statistics model, in which a state is drawn first from a distribution
from some parameterized family and then buyers’ and sellers’ values are drawn, conditional on
the state, from distributions from another parameterized family.
To state our three assumptions formally, let 1p¨q be the indicator function and define the true
demand and supply for the k-th unit by buyer b and seller s at price p as: Dbkppq “ 1
`
vbk ě p
˘
and Sskppq “ 1 pc
s
k ď pq. We denote the demand at price p for the k-th unit of the buyers who
are still active at price pB by D
NAppBq
k ppq, and of those who have dropped out by D
NOppBq
k ppq.
Adding the two we obtain the aggregate demand for the k-th unit DNk ppq, which allows us to
define aggregate demand at price p as DN ppq “
řkB
k“1D
N
k ppq. Similarly, we denote the supply
at price p for the k-th unit of the active sellers at price pS by S
MAppSq
k ppq and of those who
have dropped out by S
MOppSq
k ppq; aggregate supply for the k-th unit is denoted by S
M
k ppq and
aggregate supply at price p is SMppq “
řkS
k“1 S
M
k ppq.
Given any probability measure Pnφ , any possible event Z describing the information obtained
from buyers and sellers that have dropped out when prices pB, pS are reached, and any random
variableX which is measurable with respect to such drop-outs information, let Enφ
“
X
ˇ
ˇ Z
‰
be the
conditional expectation of X and Enφ
“
Enφ
“
X
ˇ
ˇ Z
‰‰
“ Enφ
“
X
‰
be the unconditional expectation.
Thus, for example, Enφ
“
DN ppq
ˇ
ˇ Z
‰
is expected aggregate demand at price p conditional on Z
and Enφ
“
DN ppq
‰
is unconditional expected aggregate demand at price p.
We are now ready to state our assumption that the expected per capita demand and supply
functions are strictly monotone.
Assumption 1. (Monotonicity of Demand and Supply ) There exist w and W with 0 ă w ăW
such that:
(i) For all p P r0, 1s, all ε P r0, 1´ ps, all n, and all φ P Φ, we have:
wnε ď Enφ
“
DN ppq
‰
´ Enφ
“
DN pp` εq
‰
ďWnε . (4)
(ii) For all p P r0, 1s, all ε P r0, ps, all n, and all φ P Φ, we have:
wnε ď Enφ
“
SMppq
‰
´ Enφ
“
SMpp´ εq
‰
ďWnε . (5)
Assumption 1 holds in the order statistics since there EnφrDN ppqs “ nNkBr1 ´ FφB ppqs and
EnφrSMppqs “ nMkSGφS ppq.23 More generally, a sufficient condition for Assumption 1 to hold
23The numerical simulations we discussed in Section 4 are based on and use for estimation the specificity of
the order statistics model, but the DCA satisfies asymptotic efficiency in more general settings.
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is that the probability measures Pnφ are absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure
and their Radon-Nikodym derivatives (densities) are bounded away from zero and finite.24
Our second assumption allows traders’ values to be correlated and borrows the concept of
weak independence from the statistical literature (e.g., see Bradley, 2005, and Dedecker et al.,
2007); it requires that, for any given index φ P Φ, the covariances among the marginal values of
two traders vanish as the distance between them, as measured by their position in an ordered
list, grows large.25 Given a probability measure Pnφ, consider the following covariances:
αijk pp;φq “ P
n
φ
´
Dikppq “ D
j
kppq “ 1
¯
´ Pnφ
`
Dikppq “ 1
˘
Pφ
´
Djkppq “ 1
¯
;
βijk pp;φq “ P
n
φ
´
Sikppq “ S
j
kppq “ 1
¯
´ Pnφ
`
Sikppq “ 1
˘
Pφ
´
Sjkppq “ 1
¯
.
Note that αijk pp;φq and β
ij
k pp;φq are bounded above by 1{4 and below by ´1{4. If the individual
demands at p of buyers i and j are independent as in the order statistic model, or if individual
demands are deterministic, then αijk pp;φq “ 0; similarly, if the individual supplies of sellers i
and j at p are independent conditional on φ, or if individual supplies are deterministic, then
βijk pp;φq “ 0. In both cases Assumption 2 holds.
Assumption 2. (Weak Dependence of Individual Demands and Supplies)
(i) There exists ∆B ă 8 and a permutation b Ñ i of the buyers’ names such that, for all
p P p0, 1q, all k P t1, ..., kBu, all n, all i P N and all φ P Φ:
ÿ
jPN , jąi
αijk pp;φq ď ∆B . (6)
(ii) There exists ∆S ă 8 and a permutation s Ñ i of the sellers’ names such that, for all
p P p0, 1q, all k P t1, ..., kSu, all n, all i PM and all φ P Φ:
ÿ
jPM, jąi
βijk pp;φq ď ∆S . (7)
The bite of Assumption 2 comes as the number of buyers and sellers grows large; it requires
that there is a listing of buyers, and one of sellers, under which the covariance between the
demands of any buyer b and buyer b ` τ , and seller s and s ` τ , vanishes as the distance τ
between the position in the list of the two buyers, and the two sellers, grows large. To see in an
example what Assumption 2 requires, suppose that, given φB P rφ, φs, the marginal values of
24The requirement that wnε ď Enφ
“
DN ppq
‰
´Eφ
“
DN pp` εq
‰
and wnε ď Enφ
“
SMppq
‰
´Eφ
“
SMpp´ εq
‰
is essen-
tially the same as the assumption of No Asymptotic Gaps in Cripps and Swinkels (2006), while the requirement
that Enφ
“
DN ppq
‰
´ Eφ
“
DN pp` εq
‰
ď Wnε and Enφ
“
SMppq
‰
´ Eφ
“
SMpp´ εq
‰
ď Wnε is the counterpart of their
No Asymptotic Atoms assumption.
25Cripps and Swinkels (2006)) and Peters and Severinov (2006) use different assumptions that are inspired by
the related statistical literature on mixing conditions.
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buyer 1 are independently drawn from the probability distribution FφB pvq, while the marginal
values of traders i ą 1 are independently drawn from FφB pvq with probability 0 ă λ ă 1 and
with the remaining probability they are either: (A) identical to the marginal values drawn by
trader i´1, or (B) identical to the marginal values drawn by trader 1. In case (A) Assumption
2 holds for buyers, while in case (B) it fails.26
Before formally stating the third assumption, recall that when the buyers’ clock price in the
DCA is pB and the sellers’ clock price is pS , to estimate the parameter φ the data available to
the auctioneer are the true demands and supplies of the traders that have dropped out of the
DCA, that is, of the buyers and sellers in the sets NOppBq and MOppSq. We assume that the
auctioneer computes the parameter φ that minimizes the integrated square distance between
true and expected per capita demand and supply of the traders that have dropped out; that
is, she solves the minimum distance problem:27
min
φPΦ
¨
˝
ż pB
0
˜
DNOpp
Bqppq ´ Eφ
“
DNOpp
Bqppq
‰
n
¸2
dp`
ż 1
pS
˜
SMOpp
Sqppq ´ Eφ
“
SMOpp
Sqppq
‰
n
¸2
dp
˛
‚ .
(8)
For any given event Z describing the information obtained from the traders that have dropped
out when the DCA has reached prices pB and pS , let φpZq be the solution of the mini-
mum distance problem.28 Estimated demand and supply then are EnφpZq
“
DN ppq
ˇ
ˇ Z
‰
and
EnφpZq
“
SMppq
ˇ
ˇ Z
‰
.
Convergence to efficiency requires that the estimation procedure be informative about the
stochastic process generating the data (i.e., marginal values and costs). Thus, like in any statis-
tical or econometric model, we need an identifiability assumption on the admissible probability
measures. In our setting, this is Assumption 3 below. It guarantees, loosely speaking, that the
data available are sufficient to determine the value of φ. Let Pnφ˚ be the probability measure
from which values and costs are drawn. In combination with the operation of the DCA, Pnφ˚
determines the distribution of the reserve price. Indeed, the reserve price only depends on the
event Z describing the information obtained from traders that have dropped out of the DCA;
to emphasize this dependency and the fact that the reserve price is a random variable, we will
now denote by RZ the reserve price when the event is Z.
26We would obtain the same conclusion if the marginal values of buyer 1 where drawn from a known distribution
F and then we took the realized values as the index φ; in case (A) Assumption 2 would hold, but it would not
in case (B) when each trader has the same values as buyer 1 with probability 1´ λ.
27The mean square distance is the “right” distance because to prove Theorem 2 we will use the convergence
in mean square to their expectations of aggregate demand and supply at the reserve price.
28Since Φ is a compact subset of a metric space and Pnφ is a continuous function of φ, the minimizer φpZq
of (8) exists. The size of the set Φ does not matter for our results, but it would affect the computability of
the estimator φpZq. As long as the probability measures are well behaved functions of φ, for the purpose of
computation Φ could be approximated by a finite grid.
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Assumption 3. (Identifiability) Suppose the vectors of valuations of the nN buyers and nM
sellers are drawn according to the probability measure Pnφ˚. Let Z be the event describing the
information obtained from the traders that have dropped out when the DCA has reached the
reserve price RZ . For φ P Φ and φ ‰ φ˚, let Pnφ be any other feasible probability measure.
There exists ζ ą 0 such that:
˜
Enφ˚
“
DN pRZq |Z
‰
´ Enφ
“
DN pRZq |Z
‰
n
¸2
`
˜
Enφ˚
“
SMpRZq |Z
‰
´ Enφ
“
SMpRZq |Z
‰
n
¸2
ď ζ ¨ Enφ˚
«
ż RZ
0
˜
Enφ˚
“
DNOpRZqppq
‰
´ Enφ
“
DNOpRZqppq
‰
n
¸2
dp
`
ż 1
RZ
˜
Enφ˚
“
SMOpRZqppq
‰
´ Enφ
“
SMOpRZqppq
‰
n
¸2
dp
ff
(9)
The identifiability condition requires that the difference between true expected demand and
supply and expected demand and supply according to a different probability measure at the
reserve price RZ , conditional on the event Z, is bounded by some multiple of the expected
demand and supply distance of the buyers and sellers that have dropped out at RZ .
To gain some intuition about Assumption 3 in the simplest setting, consider the order
statistics model in which there is a unique, known, distribution from which the sellers’ costs
are drawn, so that the second terms on both sides of (9) vanish, while the buyers’ values are
drawn from a distribution belonging to a parameterized family. Let |NApRZq| be the number of
buyers still active at the reserve price RZ . Then, conditional on the event Z, all active buyers
demand at least one unit plus an additional number of units equal to the number of the other
kB ´ 1 independent draws that are above RZ . In other words, expected demand conditional
on Z by an active buyer when the index is φ˚ is: 1 ` pkB ´ 1qr1 ´ Fφ˚pRZqs. It then follows
that the left hand side of (9) is:
´
|NApRZq|
n pkB ´ 1qrFφpRZq ´ Fφ˚pRZqs
¯2
, which is less than
N2pkB´1q
2rFφpRZq´Fφ˚pRZqs
2. We may follow the same approach to compute the integrand
on the right hand side of (9), after first noting that there is no conditioning on the event Z apart
from the number |NOpRZq| of buyers who have dropped out before the reserve price is reached.
Thus, the integrand on the right hand side of (9) is:
´
|NOpRZq|
n kBrFφppq ´ Fφ˚ppqs
¯2
. It follows
that Assumption 3 holds if φ ‰ φ˚ implies that for all p P p0, 1s, we have Fφpvq ‰ Fφ˚pvq for a
positive Lebesgue measure set of values v P p0, ps.29
The first, trivial, way in which Assumption 3 would fail is if for all feasible probability
measures, all buyers had the highest possible value for the first unit, vb1 “ 1 for all b, and all
sellers had the lowest possible cost for the first unit cs1 “ 0 for all s. In such a case there would
be no drop-outs at any interior reserve price and the right hand side of (9) would always equal
29Note that the expected number of buyers that drop out by the time any reserve price r is reached is
nNFφ˚prq
kB
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Figure 2: Illustration of bounds on welfare losses. Panel (a): Buyers are on short side at
r. Panel (b): Sellers are on short side at r. Generically, r will not be equal to any agent’s
value or cost while PnS pD
nprqq and PnDpS
nprqq are, by construction, equal to a cost or a value,
respectively.
zero.30 More generally, for Assumption 3 to fail the active traders at the reserve price must be
unpredictably different from the inactive traders. Thus, in a similar vein to the example just
discussed, suppose for simplicity that all sellers’ values are independently drawn from the same
distribution G while buyers are first drawn to be weak or strong; weak buyers draw all their
values independently from the same distribution F , while strong buyers value the first unit at
1 and the marginal values for all other units are independently drawn from a distribution Fφ,
with φ P Φ. Now there will be traders that drop out (both sellers and weak buyers), but their
values provide no information about the values of the strong buyers.
We are now ready to prove the asymptotic efficiency of the DCA. Denote by PnBpqq “
 
min p : DN pp1q ď q ď DN ppq for all p1 ą p
(
the inverse realized market demand and by PnS pqq “
 
max p : SMpp1q ď q ď SMppq for all p1 ă p
(
the inverse realized market supply. Consider the
demand and supply diagram in Figure 2, with r being the realized reserve price. When buyers
are on the short side of the market – i.e., when DN prq ă SMpr1q for some r1 ă r, as in Panel (a)
– the quantity traded in the DCA is qprq “ DN prq; let PnS
`
DN prq
˘
ă r be the price at which
supply is equal to DN prq. The difference between efficient and realized welfare, WCEpθq´W pθq,
is bounded above by the area of the shaded rectangle ABCD. Thus, the welfare difference is at
most the area of this rectangle; that is, rr ´ PnS
`
DN prq
˘
s ¨ rSMprq ´DN prqs. Similarly, when
sellers are on the short side of the market – i.e., when SMprq ă DN pr1q for some r1 ą r as
30Note however that if the auctioneer knows this information, she could allocate the first unit from sellers to
buyers at an arbitrary price and then run the DCA.
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in Panel (b) of Figure 2 – the quantity traded is qprq “ SMprq; let PnB
`
pSMprq
˘
be the price
at which demand would be equal to SMprq. The welfare difference is now bounded above by
rPnB
`
SMprq
˘
´ rs ¨ rDN prq ´ SMprqs, the area of the rectangle EFGH.
In the proof of Theorem 2 we show that the ratio of the area of the rectangle ABCD (or
EFGH) to total welfare, and hence the expected percentage welfare loss, converges to zero at
rate 1{n.
Theorem 2. Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, the expected percentage welfare loss in the DCA
converges to zero at rate 1{n as nÑ8.
To prove Theorem 2 we need to establish that the expected distance between demand and
supply at the reserve price r reached by the DCA is “small”. The proof strategy is to observe
that an upper bound on the expected distance between demand and supply is given by a
multiple of the highest of three expected distances, all of which are small. The first is the
expected distance between demand and expected demand at r (given the true index φ˚). The
second is the expected distance between supply and expected supply at r (again, given the
index φ˚). The proof that these two expected distances are small appeals to the law of large
numbers, Corollary 1 in the Appendix, and only requires monotonicity and weak dependence of
demand and supply, that is, Assumptions 1 and 2. The third expected distance is the expected
distance between estimated demand and estimated supply; that is, the expected magnitude of
estimated excess demand. The claim that this expected distance is small is in Lemma 2 in
the Appendix. This is the only part of the proof of Theorem 2 that requires our identifiability
condition, Assumption 3.
The rate of convergence to efficiency in Theorem 2 is 1{n because the auctioneer uses the
empirical distribution of values and costs of the traders that have dropped out to estimate
demand and supply, and the empirical distribution converges to the true distribution at rate
1{
?
n. In McAfee (1992, see his Remark 3 on p.444) the rate of convergence is 1{n2 as the gap
between demand and supply is never more than one unit; with single unit traders there is no
need to use the values and costs of the traders that have dropped out to estimate demand and
supply at the current prices. Thus, in McAfee’s mechanism not only the percentage welfare loss,
but also the total welfare loss goes to zero as the number of traders increases. The literature
on the k-double auction (see Rustichini et al., 1994, and Cripps and Swinkels, 2006) has also
obtained convergence to efficiency at rate 1{n2. In that literature, no estimation procedure is
needed as the auctioneer is passive and the traders know the true distribution of values and
costs when computing their equilibrium strategies. The k-double auction literature puts the
burden of aggregating information on the traders’ knowledge of the true distribution and their
ability to compute and coordinate on an equilibrium.31 In contrast, our DCA puts the burden
31In the case of unit demand and supply it is well known that there are a continuum of equilibria. In the
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of aggregating information on the auctioneer, making the traders’ strategy straightforward.
Finally, the random splitting mechanism in Kojima and Yamashita (2017, see their Remark 3
on p.1424) converges to efficiency at rate 1{n1{6. Their and our rate of convergence, however,
are not not easily comparable, as the models are different; they assume interdependent values
and single dimensional types determining the shape of a trader’s valuation.
6 Conclusions
Progress in research is made one step at a time; in this paper, we have proposed an estimation-
based market design for a homogeneous good market which targets efficiency. In contrast
to Walrasian tâtonnement, from which it draws inspiration, it maintains dominant strategy
incentive compatibility throughout by making all agents price-takers at all times.
Importantly, our DCA achieves this while accommodating multi-unit traders, which is of
relevance in practice. Of course, it can be criticized on the ground that it does not perform well
(e.g., in the large) in environments different from those we have studied. This is however true
of any mechanism; for example, McAfee’s double auction has nice incentive and asymptotic
properties with single-unit traders, but these properties do not hold in “naive” extensions of the
double auction if one introduces multi-unit traders with multi-dimensional types. Similarly, our
DCA may be vulnerable to shill bidding if the designer cannot prevent agents from registering
under multiple identities, because it estimates target prices and eventually the reserve price
based on the revealed values and costs of the traders that have dropped out. By registering
multiple times and dropping out early on the shills an agent may be able to affect the price
at which she trades in her favor. Robustness to shill bidding is not a problem specific to our
mechanism but applies to the entire literature on mechanism design with estimation.
Our DCA design is quite flexible, and can be modified in several ways, depending on the
goals and constraints facing the designer, while preserving the property that sincere bidding is
a dominant strategy equilibrium.
First, the DCA generates a budget surplus, because it runs an Ausubel auction on the
long side of the market. While in many practical applications (e.g., double auctions run by
governments or public agencies) running a surplus is acceptable, or even desirable, a budget
surplus could be avoided by using a rationing procedure instead of an Ausubel auction. Suppose
that after selecting the reserve price the auctioneer randomly selects a priority order of the
traders on the long side of the market and fulfills their demands or supplies according to the
drawn priority, up to the quantity determined on the short side of the market. All traders
are charged or paid the reserve price for each unit they receive or provide. This modification
does not change the incentive properties of the DCA, as no trader can affect the reserve price
case of multi-unit demands and supplies it is only known that a mixed strategy equilibrium exists, but no such
equilibrium has yet been found.
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unless they drop out. They also cannot profitably affect the quantity traded. Thus, Theorem 1
continues to hold and the modified DCA balances the budget. However, this comes at the cost
of giving up constrained efficiency and slowing the convergence to efficiency as the number of
traders grows. Consider the case when buyers are on the long side of the market. The number
of efficient trades that are not completed is still given by the difference between demand and
supply at the random reserve price RZ , D
N pRZq ´ S
MpRZq. However, as the non-completed
trades are randomly selected among buyers with marginal values above RZ , the upper bound
on the welfare loss is now (some multiple of) DN pRZq ´ S
MpRZq. Thus, an upper bound
on the expected percentage efficiency loss is Enφ˚
„?
pDN pRZq´SMpRZqq2
n

. Since Lemma 2 in
Appendix A proves that Enφ˚
„
Enφ˚
”
DN pRZq´S
MpRZq
n
ˇ
ˇZ
ı2

converges to zero at rate 1{n, it
follows from Jensen’s inequality that the expected percentage efficiency loss of the DCA with
rationing converges to zero at rate 1{
?
n.
Second, our DCA can be modified to allow for the incorporation of constraints on the
aggregate quantities subsets of bidders may be allocated or may procure, such as a cap on the
number of units a subgroup of buyers may acquire in total. Quantity constraints like these
may arise for a number of reasons, such as antitrust concerns or technological constraints.
Third, in the DCA the auctioneer selects target prices in each estimation round and the
clock state is determined so as to achieve equality of estimated demand and supply; the goal
is to reach a unique reserve price at which estimated excess demand is zero. A profit max-
imizing intermediary could instead set target prices and clock states so as to target equality
of estimated marginal cost and marginal benefit (derived from estimated demand and sup-
ply), with the goal of reaching two different reserve prices, one for buyers and one for sellers,
at which estimated marginal revenue equals estimated marginal cost and estimated demand
equals estimated supply. Call maximum profit the profit that would be generated if the profit
maximizing intermediary knew demand and supply, but was constrained to select two prices,
a uniform price for buyers and a uniform price for sellers.32 With an additional monotonicity
assumption on marginal cost and benefit, we conjecture that such a modified DCA would be
asymptotically profit maximizing; that is, the percentage profit loss relative to maximum profit
would convergences to zero as the number of traders grows. We leave a proper investigation to
future research.
In future research, it would also be important to expand the setup to allow for heterogenous
commodities or incorporate versions of the assignment model.33 The latter is simpler than what
32Extending Myerson’s (1981) optimal single-side auction in a Bayesian setting to the case of buyers with
multi-unit demand is still an open problem; a fortiori, we do not know the Bayesian mechanism (or, for that
matter, the dominant strategy mechanism) that maximizes the intermediary profit in a setting with multi-unit
demands and supplies and no restrictions on the prices the intermediary may charge.
33See Ausubel (2006) and Shapley and Shubik (1972), respectively.
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we have studied here, insofar as agents trade at most one unit, but the challenges arise because
there is no natural ordering of agents according to their types. One could also depart from the
two-sided setup we considered here by studying an asset market model in which every agent
is endowed with some units while having demand for more units. This setup takes away the
market maker’s ability to separate traders a priori into buyers and sellers.
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Appendix
Lemma 1. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and the valuations and costs of the nN buyers
and nM sellers are drawn according to the probability measure Pnφ. Then there exists ∆ ă 8
such that, for all p, pB, pS P p0, 1q, k P t1, ..., kBu or k P t1, ..., kSu, and all φ P Φ:
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Enφ
„ˆ
DNk ppq ´ Eφ
“
DNk ppq
‰
n
˙2
ď
∆
n
, (10)
Enφ
„ˆ
D
NOppBq
k ppq ´ Eφ
“
D
NOppBq
k ppq
‰
nOppBq
˙2
ď
∆
nOppBq
, (11)
Enφ
„ˆ
SMk ppq ´ Eφ
“
SMk ppq
‰
n
˙2
ď
∆
n
, (12)
Enφ
„ˆ
S
MOppSq
k ppq ´ Eφ
“
S
MOppSq
k ppq
‰
mOppSq
˙2
ď
∆
mOppSq
. (13)
Proof. We will only prove (10), as the the proofs of (11) – (13) are analogous. We have:
Enφ
„ˆ
DNk ppq ´ Enφ
“
DNk ppq
‰
n
˙2
“
1
n2
Enφ
„ˆ
ÿ
iPN
´
Dikppq ´ Enφ
“
Dikppq
‰
¯
˙2
“
1
n2
¨
ÿ
iPN
˜
Enφ
„ˆ
Dikppq ´ Enφ
“
Dikppq
‰
˙2
` 2
ÿ
jPN , jąi
Enφ
„ˆ
Dikppq ´ Enφ
“
Dikppq
‰
˙ˆ
Djkppq ´ E
n
φ
“
Djkppq
‰
˙
¸
“
1
n2
¨
ÿ
iPN
˜
Enφ
„ˆ
Dikppq ´ Enφ
“
Dikppq
‰
˙2
` 2
ÿ
jPN , jąi
´
Enφ
“
DikppqD
j
kppq
‰
´ Enφ
“
Dikppq
‰
Enφ
“
Djkppq
‰
¯
¸
“
1
n2
¨
ÿ
iPN
˜
Enφ
„ˆ
Dikppq ´ Enφ
“
Dikppq
‰
˙2
` 2
ÿ
jPN , jąi
αijk pp;φq
¸
ď
1
n2
¨
´
n` 2n∆B
¯
,
where the inequality follows from Assumption 2. Setting ∆ “ 1`2∆B concludes the proof.
34Expectations in (11) and (13) are taken given the identities of the inactive traders in NOppBq and MOppSq.
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Corollary 1. Suppose the valuations and costs of the nN buyers and nM sellers are drawn
according to the probability measure Pnφ and Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, then there exists ∆ ă 8
such that, for all p, pB, pS P p0, 1q, and all φ P Φ:
Enφ
„ˆ
DN ppq ´ Enφ
“
DN ppqs
n
˙2
ď
∆
n
, (14)
Enφ
„ˆ
DNOpp
Bqppq ´ Enφ
“
DNOpp
Bqppqs
nOppBq
˙2
ď
∆
nOppBq
, (15)
Enφ
„ˆ
SMppq ´ Enφ
“
SMppq
‰
n
˙2
ď
∆
n
, (16)
Enφ
„ˆ
SMOpp
Sqppq ´ Enφ
“
SMOpp
Sqppq
‰
mOppSq
˙2
ď
∆
mOppSq
. (17)
Proof. Define Y Nk ppq “ D
N
k ppq ´ Eφ
“
DNk ppq
‰
. It is:
Enφ
„ˆ
DN ppq ´ Enφ
“
DN ppq
‰
n
˙2
“ Enφ
„ˆ kB
ÿ
k“1
DNk ppq ´ Enφ
“
DNk ppq
‰
n
˙2
“ Enφ
„ˆ kB
ÿ
k“1
Y Nk ppq
n
˙2
“
kB
ÿ
k“1
Enφ
„ˆ
Y Nk ppq
n
˙2
` 2
kB
ÿ
k“1
kB
ÿ
h“k`1
Enφ
„ˆ
Y Nk ppq
n
˙ˆ
Y Nh ppq
n
˙
ď
kB
ÿ
k“1
Enφ
„ˆ
Y Nk ppq
n
˙2
` 2
kB
ÿ
k“1
kB
ÿ
h“k`1
Enφ
„ˆ
Y Nk ppq
n
˙21{2
¨ Enφ
„ˆ
Y Nh ppq
n
˙21{2
loooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooomoooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooon
by Hölder’s inequality
ď pkBq
2 ¨ max
kPt1,...,kBu
"
Eφ
„ˆ
Y Nk ppq
n
˙2*
“ pkBq
2 ¨ max
kPt1,...,kBu
"
Eφ
„ˆ
DNk ppq ´ Enφ
“
DNk ppq
‰
n
˙2*
.
Then (14) follows from Lemma 1. The proofs of (15) – (17) are analogous.
Corollary 2. Suppose the valuations and costs of the nN buyers and nM sellers are drawn
according to the probability measure Pnφ and Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, then there exists ∆ ă 8
such that, for all p, pB, pS P p0, 1q, all events Z determining the set of buyers and sellers that
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have dropped out when prices are pB and pS and all φ P Φ:
Enφ
„ˆ
DN ppq ´ Enφ
“
DN ppq |Zs
n
˙2
ď
∆
n
, (18)
Enφ
„ˆ
SMppq ´ Enφ
“
SMppq |Z
‰
n
˙2
ď
∆
n
. (19)
Proof. We only prove (18), as the the proof of (19) is analogous. It is:
Enφ
„ˆ
DN ppq ´ Enφ
“
DN ppq |Z
‰
n
˙2
“ Enφ
„
1
n2
¨
´
DN ppq2 ` Enφ
“
DN ppq |Z
‰2
´ 2DN ppqEnφ
“
DN ppq |Z
‰
¯

“
1
n2
¨
ˆ
Enφ
”
DN ppq2
ı
` Enφ
”
Enφ
“
DN ppq |Z
‰2
ı
´ 2Enφ
”
Enφ
”
DN ppqEnφ
“
DN ppq |Z
‰
|Z
ıı
looooooooooooooooooooooomooooooooooooooooooooooon
by iterated expectations
˙
“
1
n2
¨
ˆ
Enφ
”
DN ppq2
ı
´ Enφ
”
Enφ
“
DN ppq |Z
‰2
ı
˙
ď Enφ
„ˆ
DN ppq
n
˙2
´ Enφ
„
DN ppq
n
2
looooooomooooooon
by Jensen’s inequality
“ Enφ
„ˆ
DN ppq ´ Enφ
“
DN ppq
‰
n
˙2
ď
∆
n
lomon
by Corollary 1.
Proof of Theorem 2. Take φ˚ to be the true index; that is, take Pnφ˚ to be the probability
measure determining values and costs. Define δS as δS “ rr ´ P
n
S
`
DN prq
˘
s, where r is the
realized reserve price. By Assumption 1, nwδS ď Enφ˚rS
Mprq ´ SMpr ´ δSqs “ Enφ˚rS
N prq ´
DN prqs; thus, when buyers are on the short side, we have that Enφ˚
“ˇ
ˇDN prq ´ SMprq
ˇ
ˇ
‰2
{nw
is an upper bound of the area of the rectangle ABCD in Fig. 2(a), which in turn is an an
upper bound of the expected welfare loss when the reserve price is r. Similarly, define δB “
rPnB
`
SmathcalM prq
˘
´ rs. By Assumption 1, nwδB ď Enφ˚rD
N prq ´DN pr ` δBqs “ Enφ˚rD
N ´
SMprqs; thus, when sellers are on the short side of the market, Enφ˚
1
nw
“ˇ
ˇDN prq ´ SMprq
ˇ
ˇ
‰2
is
also an upper bound of the expected welfare loss, as it is an upper bound of the area of the
rectangle EFGH in Fig. 2(b).
Recall that the reserve price RZ only depends on the event Z describing the informa-
tion obtained from traders that have dropped out of the DCA. The percentage welfare loss is
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Lpθq “ pWCEpθq´W pθqq{nWCEpθq{n and the per capita efficient welfare is finite, has finite variance and its
expectation converges to a finite level as n Ñ 8. By Assumption 1, we may then conclude
that to prove that the expected percentage efficiency loss Enφ˚ rLpθqs converges to zero at rate
1{n, it is sufficient to prove that the expectation of the numerator of Lpθq, which is bounded
above by 1nE
n
φ˚
1
n
”
Enφ˚
“
|DN pRZq ´ S
MpRZq|
ˇ
ˇZ
‰
ı2
, converges to zero at rate 1{n, where the
inside expectation is taken over demand and supply conditional on Z and the outside expec-
tation is over events Z and hence the random reserve price RZ . That is, we must prove that
Enφ˚
”
Enφ˚
”
|DN pRZq´S
MpRZq|
n
ˇ
ˇZ
ıı2
ď Ln for some constant L ą 0 and all n. By Jensen’s in-
equality: Enφ˚
”
Enφ˚
”
|DN pRZq´S
MpRZq|
n
ˇ
ˇZ
ıı2
ď Enφ˚
„
Enφ˚
„
´
DN pRZq´S
MpRZq
n
¯2 ˇ
ˇZ

and hence
it suffices to show that for some L ą 0 and all n: Enφ˚
„
Enφ˚
„
´
DN pRZq´S
MpRZq
n
¯2 ˇ
ˇZ

ď Ln .
For all r P r0, 1s, define expected excess demand at r asXNφ˚pr;Zq “ Enφ˚
“
DN prq ´ SMprq |Z
‰
.
Note that for all Z and RZ P r0, 1s:
Enφ˚
«
Enφ˚
«
ˆ
DN pRZq ´ S
MpRZq
n
˙2
ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
Z
ffff
“ Enφ˚
«
Enφ˚
«˜
DN pRZq ´ Eφ˚rDN pRZq|Zs
n
´
SMpRZq ´ Eφ˚rSMpRZq|Zs
n
`
XNφ˚pRZ ;Zq
n
¸2
ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
Z
ffff
ď 9 max
#
Enφ˚
«
Enφ˚
«˜
DN pRZq ´ Enφ˚rD
N pRZq|Zs
n
¸2
ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
Z
ffff
,
Enφ˚
«
Enφ˚
«˜
SMpRZq ´ Enφ˚rS
MpRZq |Zs
n
¸2
ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
Z
ffff
, Enφ˚
«
Enφ˚
«˜
XNφ˚pRZ ;Zq
n
¸2 ff
ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
Z
ff+
.
To conclude the proof we only need to show that there exists ∆ ă 8 such that each of the
three terms in the max is smaller than ∆{n. For the first two terms, this follows immediately
from Corollary 1, as the inequality holds for all realizations of RZ . Lemma 2 below shows that
the third term, which equals Enφ˚
”´
XNφ˚ pRZ ;Zq
n
¯2ı
is also smaller than ∆n .
Lemma 2. Suppose the valuations and costs of the nN buyers and nM sellers are drawn
according to the probability measure Pnφ˚ and Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold, then there exists
∆ ă 8 such that: Enφ˚
”´
XNφ˚ pRZ ;Zq
n
¯2ı
ď ∆n .
Proof. We first need to establish two preliminary lemmas.
Lemma 3. Suppose the valuations and costs of the nN buyers and nM sellers are drawn
according to the probability measure Pnφ˚ and Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold. Let Z be the event
containing the information from the dropped-out traders. There exists ∆ ă 8 such that:
Enφ˚
«˜
XNφ˚pRZ ;Zq ´ E
n
φpZq
“
DN pRZq ´ S
MpRZq |Z
‰
n
¸2 ff
ď
∆
n
.
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Proof. Note that:
´
XNφ˚pRZ ;Zqq ´ E
n
φpZq
“
DN pRZq ´ S
MpRZq |Z
‰
¯2
“
´
Enφ˚
“
DN pRZq ´ S
MpRZq |Z
‰
´ EnφpZq
“
DN pRZq ´ S
MpRZq |Z
‰
¯2
ď 2
´
Enφ˚
“
DN pRZq |Z
‰
´ EnφpZq
“
DN pRZq |Z
‰
¯2
` 2
´
Enφ˚
“
SMpRZq |Z
‰
´ EnφpZq
“
SMpRZq |Z
‰
¯2
(20)
Taking the expectation with respect to Pnφ˚ , by Assumption 3 there exists a ζ ą 0 such that:
1
2ζ
¨ Enφ˚
«˜
XNφ˚pRZ ;Zq ´ E
n
φpZq
“
DN pRZq ´ S
MpRZq |Z
‰
n
¸2 ff
ď Enφ˚
«
ż RZ
0
˜
Enφ˚
“
DNOpRZqptq
‰
´ EnφpZq
“
DNOpRZqptq
‰
n
¸2
dt
`
ż 1
RZ
˜
Enφ˚
“
SMOpRZqptq
‰
´ EnφpZq
“
SMOpRZqptq
‰
n
¸2
dt
ff
“ Enφ˚
«
ż RZ
0
˜
Enφ˚
“
DNOpRZqptq
‰
´DNOpRZqptq `DNOpRZqptq ´ EnφpZq
“
DNOpRZqptq
‰
n
¸2
dt
`
ż 1
RZ
˜
Enφ˚
“
SMOpRZqptq
‰
´ SMOpRZqptq ` SMOpRZqptq ´ EnφpZq
“
SMOpRZqptq
‰
n
¸2
dt
ff
ď 2Enφ˚
«
ż RZ
0
˜
Enφ˚
“
DNOpRZqptq
‰
´DNOpRZqptq
n
¸2
dt`
ż RZ
0
˜
DNOpRZqptq ´ EnφpZq
“
DNOpRZqptq
‰
n
¸2
dt
`
ż 1
RZ
˜
Enφ˚
“
SMOpRZqptq
‰
´ SMOpRZqptq
n
¸2
dt`
ż 1
RZ
˜
SMOpRZqptq ´ EnφpZq
“
SMOpRZqptq
‰
n
¸2
dt
ff
ď 4Enφ˚
«
ż RZ
0
˜
Enφ˚
“
DNOpRZqptq
‰
´DNOpRZqptq
n
¸2
dt`
ż 1
RZ
˜
Enφ˚
“
SMOpRZqptq
‰
´ SMOpRZqptq
n
¸2
dt
ff
where the first inequality follows from Assumption 3, the second from simple algebra, and the
third from the definition of φpZq in (8) as the minimum distance estimation index.
Applying Corollary 1 concludes the proof of Lemma 3, as for some ∆ ą 0 two terms in the
square brackets on the right hand side are both less than ∆nζ for all realization RZ .
Lemma 4. Suppose the valuation and costs of the nN buyers and nM sellers are drawn
according to the probability measure Pnφ˚ and Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold. Let Z be the event
containing the information from the dropped-out traders. There exists ∆ ă 8 such that:
Enφ˚
«˜
EnφpZqrD
N pRZq ´ S
MpRZq
ˇ
ˇZ
‰
n
¸2 ff
ď
∆
n
.
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Proof. Recall that given an event Z estimated demand and estimated supply at RZ are given
by EφpZqrDN pRZq |Zs and EφpZqrSMpRZq |Zs. There are three cases, or set of events, to
consider depending on whether estimated demand is greater, equal or smaller than estimated
supply. The case of equality is trivial, as it obviously implies that the term in brackets in the
inequality in the lemma is less than ∆n for any ∆ ą 0. The cases of estimated excess demand
and estimated excess supply are mirror images of one another and we will thus only consider
one of them.
Thus, take events Z for which EφpZqrDN pRZq |Zs ą EφpZqrSMpRZq |Zs, so that the last
clock state of the DCA, the state when the reserve price is reached, is a buyers’ clock state.
This implies that the state preceding the last clock state is either a double clock or a sellers’
clock state and there was a sequence of clock prices along which the sellers’ price decreased
until it reached RZ and the buyers’ clock price stayed constant or increased and stopped at
RZ ´ εB. Along that price sequence conditional estimated supply must be at least as large
as conditional estimated demand and the sequence must end with either a seller or a buyer
dropping out of the DCA. Denote by Z´ the event that occurred before the state preceding
the last; this is the event used to estimate demand and supply in the the second to last state.
As we have argued, it must be EφpZ´qrDN pRZ ´ εBq |Z´s ď EφpZ´qrSMpRZq |Z´s and hence:
´
EφpZqrDN pRZq ´ SMpRZq |Zs
¯2
(21)
ď
˜
EφpZqrDN pRZq |Zs ´ EφpZqrSMpRZq |Zs ` EφpZ´qrS
MpRZq |Z´s ´ EφpZ´qrD
N pRZ ´ εBq |Z´s
¯2
ď
´
EφpZqrDN pRZq |Zs´Eφ˚rDN pRZq |Zs ` Eφ˚rDN pRZq |Zs
loooooooooooooooooooooooooomoooooooooooooooooooooooooon
“ 0
´DN pRZq `D
N pRZq
loooooooooooomoooooooooooon
“ 0
´Eφ˚rDN pRZq |Z´s ` Eφ˚rDN pRZ ´ εBq |Z´s
looooooooooooooooooooooooooooooomooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooon
Eφ˚ rD
N pRZ ´ εBq |Z´s ě Eφ˚ rDN pRZq |Z´s
´ EφpZ´qrD
N pRZ ´ εBq |Z´s
´ EφpZqrSMpRZq |Zs`Eφ˚rSMpRZq |Zs ´ Eφ˚rSMpRZq |Zs
loooooooooooooooooooooooooomoooooooooooooooooooooooooon
“ 0
`SMpRZq ´ S
MpRZq
looooooooooooomooooooooooooon
“ 0
`Eφ˚rSMpRZq |Z´s ´ Eφ˚rSMpRZq |Z´s
loooooooooooooooooooooooooooomoooooooooooooooooooooooooooon
“ 0
`EφpZ´qrS
MpRZq |Z´s
¯2
ď 8
´
EφpZqrDN pRZq |Zs ´ Eφ˚rDN pRZq |Zs
¯2
` 8
´
Eφ˚rDN pRZq |Zs ´DN pRZq
¯2
` 8
´
DN pRZq ´ Eφ˚rDN pRZq |Z´s
¯2
` 8
´
Eφ˚rDN pRZ ´ εBq |Z´s ´ EφpZ´qrD
N pRZ ´ εBq |Z´s
¯2
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` 8
´
EφpZqrSMpRZq |Zs ´ Eφ˚rSMpRZq |Zs
¯2
` 8
´
Eφ˚rSMpRZq |Zs ´ SMpRZq
¯2
` 8
´
SMpRZq ´ Eφ˚rSMpRZq |Z´s
¯2
` 8
´
Eφ˚rSMpRZq |Z´s ´ EφpZ´qrS
MpRZq |Z´s
¯2
Taking the expectation with respect to Pnφ˚ , we obtain:
1
8
¨ Eφ˚
„ˆEφpZqrDN pRZq ´ SMpRZq |Zs
n
˙2
ď Eφ˚
„
´Eφ˚rDN pRZq |Zs ´DN pRZq
n
¯2

` Eφ˚
„
´DN pRZq ´ Eφ˚rDN pRZq |Z´s
n
¯2

` Eφ˚
„
´Eφ˚rSMpRZq |Zs ´ SMpRZq
n
¯2

` Eφ˚
„
´SMpRZq ´ Eφ˚rSMpRZq |Z´s
n
¯2

`
1
n2
Eφ˚
„
´
EφpZqrDN pRZq |Zs ´ Eφ˚rDN pRZq |Zs
¯2
`
´
EφpZqrSMpRZq |Zs ´ Eφ˚rSMpRZq |Zs
¯2

`
1
n2
Eφ˚
„
´
Eφ˚rDN pRZ ´ εBq |Z´s ´ EφpZ´qrD
N pRZ ´ εBq |Z´s
¯2
`
´
Eφ˚rSMpRZq |Z´s ´ EφpZ´qrS
MpRZq |Z´s
¯2

By Corollary 2 the first four terms on the right hand side of the last expression are bounded
from above by ∆{n for some ∆ ă 8. The first of the remaining two terms is equal to half the
right hand side of (20), while the second is equal to half the right hand side of (20) conditional
on Z´ rather than Z and with the demand evaluated at RZ ´ εB instead of RZ . Following
the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 3 we conclude that there exists a ∆ ă 8
such that ∆{n is an upper bound for the two terms. This conclude the proof of Lemma 4
since, as claimed above, the case of events with expected excess supply at RZ ( i.e., such that
EφpZqrSMpRZq |Zs ą EφpZqrDN pRZq |Zs ) can be dealt analogously to the case of expected
excess demand we just considered.
We now conclude the proof of Lemma 2. For all events Z is it is:
ˆ
XNφ˚pRZ ;Zq
n
˙2
“
ˆ
XNφ˚pRZ ;Zq ´ EφpZqrD
N pRZq ´ S
MpRZq |Zs
n
`
EφpZqrDN pRZq ´ SMpRZq |Zs
n
˙2
ď 2
ˆ
XNφ˚pRZ ;Zq ´ EφpZqrD
N pRZq ´ S
MpRZq |Zs
n
˙2
` 2
ˆEφpZqrDN pRZq ´ SMpRZq |Zs
n
˙2
ď 4 max
"ˆ
XNφ˚pRZ ;Zq ´ EφpZqrD
N pRZq ´ S
MpRZq |Zs
n
˙2
,
ˆEφpZqrDN pRZq ´ SMpRZq |Zs
n
˙2*
.
Taking the expectation Enφ˚ on both sides of the inequality, Lemma 2 follows from Lemmas 3
and 4, stating that the expectation of each term in curly brackets is less than ∆{n for some
∆ ą 0.
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